There are two research traditions on dynamic memory processes. In cognitive psychology, the malleable nature of long-term memory has been extensively documented. Distortions, such as the misinformation effect or hindsight bias, illustrate that memories can be easily changed, often without their owner taking notice. On the other hand, effects like hypermnesia demonstrate that memory might be more reliable than these distortions suggest. In the neuroscience field, similar observations were obtained mostly from animal studies. Research on memory consolidation suggested that memories become progressively resistant to amnesic treatments over time, but the reconsolidation phenomenon showed that this stability can be transiently lifted when these memories are reactivated, i.e., retrieved. Surprisingly, both research traditions have not taken much notice of each others' advances in understanding memory dynamics. We apply concepts developed in neuroscience to phenomena revealed in cognitive psychology to illustrate how these twins separated at birth may be reunited again.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent research traditions in the neurosciences of memory began more than 100 years ago with observations noting that memory is most vulnerable shortly after it has been acquired. Theodule-Armand Ribot (1881) reported in his now famous monograph, "Diseases of Memory," that amnesic patients seemed to have lost memories predominantly of their recent past, whereas more remote events could still be remembered. Ribot concluded that a biological process unfolds over time that progressively renders memories stronger, such that trauma tends to cause amnesia selectively for events newly committed to memory. Some years later, Müller & Pilzecker (1900) provided a cognitive explanation for the same phenomenon. Their studies on learning and memory moved them to propose that shortly after acquisition, a phase of reactivations of the learned material takes place that stabilizes the new memory contents. Disruptions of this assumed perseveratory activity compromise memory consolidation, leading to impaired memory.
These fundamental notions inspired two of the most successful research programs probing the biological basis of memory, mostly with animals and human patient populations. Two memory models emerged out of the broad empirical fundament laid down by these effortscellular and systems consolidation. The former, mostly animal-research-derived model, closely relates to the initial consolidation ideas formulated at the beginning of the past century, as it describes molecular mechanisms unfolding after learning that change synaptic efficacy and thus implement memory on the neuronal level. Like the perseveration-consolidation model, cellular consolidation posits that the extent of memory impairment following disruption of these processes will be strongest the less advanced they are. Consequently, no memory impairments are expected for amnesic treatments applied after consolidation is completed.
System consolidation, on the other hand, is a hypothesis that refers more to a memory transfer or reorganization process than a memory stabilization process, describing a timedependent shift in brain systems that support performance. Research that gave rise to this model began with Scoville & Milner's (1957) case study of the late Henry Gustav Molaison, better known as patient H.M., who lost most of his medial temporal lobe in a surgery to relieve him from intractable epilepsy. The operation left him with a profound impairment in forming new episodic memories (anterograde amnesia) and an extensive loss of such memories, extending back years into the past (retrograde amnesia). His and similar cases, as well as animal models, suggested that such memories initially depend on the hippocampus, but come to rely on extrahippocampal, cortical areas over time.
Similar to the cellular consolidation model, systems consolidation expects a temporally graded sensitivity of memory to amnesic treatments: The less complete systems consolidation is, the more memory will be impaired following hippocampal damage.
Both cellular and systems consolidation models thus promote the idea that stability characterizes fully consolidated, i.e., long-term, memory. In cognitive psychology, however, a rich research tradition documents just the opposite, namely malleability of long-term, i.e., consolidated, memory. Bartlett's (1932) reports that over time episodic memories get systematically distorted or Loftus's (1975) demonstrations that eyewitness testimony can be quickly modified, even without the owners of these memories taking notice, seem rather opposite to the cellular and systems consolidation account.
How can these fields of memory research be reconciled? We develop the argument that memory retrieval forms the missing link between these phenomena of stability of consolidated memory on the one hand and their lability on the other. First, we describe the reconsolidation phenomenon, illustrating that reactivation, counter to the assumptions of cellular and systems consolidation, can transfer long-term memories again into a labile state, from which they, just like new memories, need to be restabilized in order to be preserved. Thus, memory transformation processes as described by cellular and systems consolidation seem to be invoked each time long-term memory is recalled and undergoes reconsolidation. We show that prominent memory malleability phenomena documented in cognitive psychology, such as the misinformation effect, hindsight bias, flashbulb memory, hypermnesia, reminiscence, and interference, all invoke memory retrieval as a central component. Departing from this observation, we suggest how consolidation and reconsolidation could explain these memory effects, and how the two concepts may help constrain theory formation both in neuroscience and in cognitive psychology. Müller & Pilzecker (1900) observed in their classic studies on retroactive interference that the participants reiterated syllables they learned recently. Memory was impaired when reiteration was disrupted by, for example, presenting additional lists of syllables to learn or by any other "mental activity." In their attempts to explain the phenomenon, they suggested that "the tendency to perseverate [. . .] might serve to consolidate the associations among [the syllables]" (p. 68). Hebb's (1949; see also Gerard 1949) dual-trace memory theory was the first to provide a physiological explanation for Müller and Pilzecker's perseveration-consolidation concept and thus for time-dependent memory vulnerability. He proposed that new memories are stabilized by recurrent neural activity of the network (cell assembly) representing the new experience. This activity was thought to correspond to short-term memory. If left undisturbed, it leads to morphological alterations of the network's synapses, rendering the connections among the participating neurons permanent and thus allowing for regenerating the pattern of activity at a later point. This structural modification was proposed to correspond to long-term memory.
SYNAPTIC CONSOLIDATION AND RECONSOLIDATION
A large body of empirical evidence has been accumulated over the years since then, demonstrating that for some period after learning, termed the "consolidation interval," memories are labile and vulnerable to alteration. First, amnesia can be induced if treatments such as electroconvulsive shock (Duncan 1949) or protein synthesis inhibitors (Flexner et al. 1965) are given shortly after learning. Second, performance can be impaired if new competing learning occurs in short temporal proximity to the initial learning (Gordon & Spear 1973) . Third, retention can be enhanced by administration of various compounds, such as strychnine (McGaugh & Krivanek 1970) . Critically, all three manipulations are effective only when given shortly after new learning, not when given after a delay.
These and similar data form the empirical basis of the synaptic consolidation hypothesis, which states that memories are captured in the brain through changes in synaptic efficacy, and that these changes depend upon complex cellular and molecular mechanisms that lead to structural alterations underpinning potentiated synaptic function (Glickman 1961 , Hebb 1949 , McGaugh 1966 . These changes can take several hours, during which memory becomes consolidated and enters a state referred to as longterm memory, in which memory is thought to be fixed and no longer susceptible to previously effective amnesic or enhancing treatments (McGaugh 1966) . Around the 1970s, however, some anomalous effects emerged that could not be readily explained by the then dominant synaptic consolidation doctrine. On the one hand, there were studies showing recovery from amnesia (e.g., Quartermain et al. 1970 , Serota 1971 , and the debate arose whether the inability to remember after amnesic treatments indeed represents disrupted consolidation, i.e., actual memory loss, or rather a transient or permanent inability to retrieve memory that still is available (Lewis 1979 , Miller & Springer 1974 , Spear 1973 . If long-term memory requires synaptic consolidation, then no recovery should be seen if the process terminated prematurely. This issue has never been resolved, as both the retrieval-and the storage-impairment positions can explain any result from studies showing memory recovery or lack thereof after amnesia, and thus the debate arrived at a stalemate (Nader & Wang 2006 ; but see Hardt et al. 2009b for a possible resolution).
The other challenge to the idea of memory consolidation was a small set of studies (e.g., Misanin et al. 1968 , Robbins & Meyer 1970 , Schneider & Sherman 1968 showing that even consolidated memories could again return to a state of vulnerability. Similar to demonstrations of a consolidation period, these studies provided evidence that memory reactivation could return consolidated memories to a transient labile state during which they were sensitive to amnesic treatments, suggesting that reactivated memory restabilizes, or reconsolidates, as this process was to be called later. A number of those researchers who were already unconvinced by the consolidation idea argued in light of these findings instead that memories were always open to alteration and/or disruption, so long as they were in an active state, which was the state of newly formed memories or retrieved long-term memories (cf. Lewis 1979 , Mactutus et al. 1979 , Miller & Springer 1973 , Spear & Mueller 1984 . The potential of inactive memories to transfer to an active state was considered to be a basic property of memories, regardless of previous activations or the age of the memory. Contrary to this model, the synaptic consolidation idea characterizes the stabilization process as unidirectional-memories progress gradually from unstable to stable and thus become progressively resistant to disruptions.
As in the case of consolidation, three lines of evidence support the existence of a postreactivation restabilization, or reconsolidation, period. First, performance can be impaired if amnesic treatments such as electroconvulsive shock are given shortly after reactivation (Misanin et al. 1968 , Schneider & Sherman 1968 . Second, performance can be impaired if new competing learning occurs in short temporal proximity to the reactivation (Gordon 1977a) . Third, retention can be enhanced by administration of various compounds, such as strychnine, after reactivation (Gordon 1977b) . Critically, these manipulations are effective only when given shortly after reactivation but not when given after a delay.
Although the reconsolidation phenomenon runs counter to the central assumptions of the cellular consolidation hypothesis, neither the phenomenon itself nor the active/inactive memory model, which was able to explain both consolidation and reconsolidation findings, received broad attention in the following decades. For reasons that remain unclear, only a small group of researchers continued to study the new effect (a detailed review of this literature is provided by Sara 2000) .
Research on memory reconsolidation was revitalized by its demonstration in auditory fear conditioning in the rat .
Targeting directly the brain circuitry critically mediating the behavior and its consolidation (basolateral nucleus of the amygdala), and using a drug with well-documented amnesic effects on memory consolidation (inhibition of protein synthesis with the antibiotic anisomycin), this study demonstrated that reminders could bring well-consolidated fear memories back into an unstable state, in which they could be disrupted. Memory impairments were not observed in the absence of reactivation. The conclusion, as in the original studies from the 1970s, was that reactivated consolidated memories return to an unstable state from which they must restabilize in order to persist.
Since this study, reconsolidation became an intensive area of investigation in the neurosciences, and it has been demonstrated in a range of species (including humans), in many different tasks and brain regions, and with various amnesic and enhancing agents. The fact that retrieval can return consolidated memory to an unstable state from which it must restabilize over time has been established as a fundamental memory process (for a review of the literature, see Nader & Hardt 2009 ).
Nevertheless, not all memories have been found to undergo reconsolidation. This property of reconsolidation was noted early on. It was thought that the induction of lability critically depended on specific parameters (Lewis 1979 , Miller & Springer 1973 , Spear 1973 . Several boundary conditions on reconsolidation, i.e., situations in which memory that would reconsolidate no longer does, have been proposed, such as the consolidation of extinction (e.g., Eisenberg et al. 2003) , memory age (e.g., Milekic & Alberini 2002) , predictability of the reactivation stimulus (e.g., Lee 2009 , Morris et al. 2006 , Pedreira et al. 2004 ), training intensity (Suzuki et al. 2004 , Wang et al. 2009 , and mode of reactivation, i.e., whether a memory is directly or indirectly reactivated (Debiec et al. 2006) .
Progress in understanding the conditions under which lability of consolidated memory will and will not be observed may provide critical insight into how certain memory malleability effects, such as misinformation effects or hindsight bias, can be prevented. As we discuss below, these memory distortions may be mediated by retrieval-induced memory malleability, and thus a better understanding of boundary conditions on reconsolidation may directly impact our understanding of these phenomena as well.
SYSTEMS CONSOLIDATION

Retrograde Amnesia in Humans
The report describing HM's memory impairments marked the beginning of a research program aimed at identifying the brain systems and mechanisms underpinning memory. Memory impairments similar to those of HM have since been found in a number of patients with medial-temporal lobe (MTL) damage. The extent of the temporal gradient of retrograde amnesia, however, has been found to vary substantially between patients, from several months to decades (e.g., Reed & Squire 1998) , and in some patients, a flat gradient, i.e., comparable amnesia for both recent and remote memories, has been documented (Kopelman & Kapur 2001) . These discrepancies may be due to the size and location of the MTL lesion. Patients with damage limited to the hippocampus have shorter gradients, typically covering a decade, whereas individuals with more extensive MTL damage show even more far-reaching retrograde memory loss (Bayley et al. 2005 , Reed & Squire 1998 .
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the length of the gradient might differ with the type of memory tested, that is, different gradients have been observed for semantic memory (memories of facts and general knowledge), episodic memory (memories of discrete events or autobiographical episodes), and allocentric spatial memory (memories of spatial relationships between objects within an environment independent of one's viewpoint) (Nadel & Moscovitch 1997) . Specifically, if damage is limited to the hippocampus, patients can present either with a lack of a retrograde gradient for semantic memories or semantic memory loss that extends back no more than about 10 years (Kapur & Brooks 1999 , Manns et al. 2003 , Rempel-Clower et al. 1996 ; gradients spanning two or three decades have been found if damage to the MTL is more extensive (Bayley et al. 2006 , Bright et al. 2006 . Similarly, for episodic memories, temporal retrograde gradients of a few years' length were detected if damage was limited to the hippocampus (Bayley et al. 2003) . When damage extended to adjacent MTL regions, a few studies either did not find a gradient or have reported retrograde amnesia extending back for decades (Cipolotti et al. 2001 , Hirano et al. 2002 , whereas others have not (Bayley et al. 2003 (Bayley et al. , 2005 .
Although the hippocampus has been implicated in the acquisition of allocentric memories (Maguire et al. 1996) , patients with large hippocampus lesions can retain spatial memories for highly familiar environments (Maguire et al. 2006 , Teng & Squire 1999 . The relatively few studies that have investigated remote spatial memory following hippocampal damage suggest that spatial memory acquired throughout childhood can remain intact (Teng & Squire 1999) , whereas spatial memories acquired later in adulthood may lose some of their detail and are not as flexible for generating new routes (Maguire et al. 2006 . These later findings suggest qualitative differences between remote hippocampus-dependent and hippocampus-independent spatial memories.
Neuroimaging Studies in Humans
Neuroimaging studies in healthy individuals have examined the role of the MTL and hippocampus in recent and remote memory. Although few studies have shown that the hippocampus is more active during the retrieval of recent than remote episodic memories (Piefke et al. 2003 , Takashima et al. 2006 , most findings suggest that the structure is similarly highly active for both recent and remote memories (Addis et al. 2004 , Gilboa et al. 2004 , Maguire 2001 , Ryan et al. 2001 , Steinvorth et al. 2006 , although one study found more hippocampal activity following the retrieval of remote memories than recent ones (Rekkas & Constable 2005) . These differences may be due to the amount of details recalled at recent and remote time points.
1 Some studies suggest that the hippocampus is more engaged in the retrieval of detailed episodic memories (Trinkler et al. 2009 ), and recent memories appear more detailed than remote ones (Piefke et al. 2003) , leading to stronger hippocampal activity for recent than remote memories (Addis et al. 2004) . When level of detail (or emotionality) of memories was controlled, the hippocampus was activated to the same level when retrieving recent or remote memories. Further evidence supporting the idea that the hippocampus plays a specific role in supporting rich, detailed episodic memories comes from studies showing that hippocampal activation declines when over time, detailed memory recollection fades away (Eldridge et al. 2000 , Viskontas et al. 2009 , Yonelinas et al. 2005 .
A number of neuroimaging studies on semantic memory have found equal hippocampal activation for recent and remote memories (Bernard et al. 2004 , Kapur et al. 1995 , Maguire 2001 , whereas others have found retrograde temporal gradients for activation in the right parahippocampal cortex (Douville et al. 2005) and right entorhinal cortex (Haist et al. 2001) . A recent study by Smith & Squire (2009) found reduced activity following the retrieval of more remote semantic memories than recent ones in the medial temporal lobe (including the hippocampus), and increased activity in the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, and parietal lobe.
1 Two additional problems in interpreting neuroimaging studies of remote memory pertain to the incidental encoding of being tested in a scanner and the selection of baseline conditions, both factors that might mask any difference between recent and remote memories. These issues lie beyond the scope of this review, and we refer the interested reader to Squire LR, Bayley PJ. 2007 
Animal Models of Systems Consolidation
Studying systems consolidation in animal models has two major advantages: First, memories of different ages can be studied prospectively by performing experimental manipulations at specific time points after memory acquisition. Second, animal models allow targeting of specific areas and/or specific molecular processes.
The first two studies to model retrograde amnesia used two very different paradigms, the socially transmitted food preference task (Winocur 1990 ) and contextual fear conditioning (Kim & Fanselow 1992) . In both studies, electrolytic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus of rats were made at different time points after training. Memory of socially transmitted food preference was impaired if lesions were made 1-2 days after training, but not when applied after five days (Winocur 1990 ). Contextual fear memory, however, was severely impaired if lesions were made 1-14 days after training, but was intact when applied 28 days after training (Kim & Fanselow 1992) . Since then, temporally graded retrograde amnesia has also been found in studies using rabbits, rats, mice, and monkeys, as well as in a number of different paradigms, following both partial and extensive lesions of the hippocampus, using various different lesioning methods (Frankland & Bontempi 2005) . One important difference between gradients in human amnesic patients and those found in animal models is the timescale of the temporal gradient, which is vastly shorter in animal models, ranging from weeks to months in contrast to years and decades in humans.
In contrast to the systems consolidation hypothesis, a number of studies have found flat gradients, such that the amnesic manipulations were similarly effective at recent and remote time-points (Burwell et al. 2004 , Gaffan 1993 , Sutherland et al. 2001 , Winocur et al. 2005 . However, given the extensive hippocampal lesions in these studies, it remains possible that cortical structures involved in the expression of remote memories were affected as well. Nevertheless, in other studies even partial hippocampal lesions have consistently been found to impair memory at all time points. These studies used the Morris water maze, a spatial task that appears to always require the hippocampus (Clark et al. 2005 , Martin et al. 2005 , Moscovitch et al. 2006 .
Indirect evidence for a special role for the hippocampus in mediating detailed aspects of spatial/contextual tasks comes from studies showing that by about four weeks after contextual fear conditioning, at a time when such memories can be expressed without a hippocampus (Kim & Fanselow 1992) , animals will show generalized fear responses to novel contexts not expressed at more recent time points (Wiltgen & Silva 2007 , Winocur et al. 2007 . Taken together, these findings suggest that reduced hippocampus involvement correlates with more schematic, less detailed, memory.
Further corroborating evidence comes from a study in which rats were reared in a complex environment (the "village") for three months (Winocur et al. 2005) . They were then trained in a specific spatial task in the village, after which they received hippocampal lesions. Interestingly, lesioned rats performed the task just as well as control animals. However, although the lesioned animals were able to perform when distal cues were substituted, they were severely impaired when spatial relations among the cues or the spatial context itself were changed (village rotated relative to distal cues; village put in a new room). These findings suggest that the rats' spared memory was less detailed than that of control animals.
Thus, similar to neuroimaging studies in humans, evidence from lesion studies in animals indicates that the hippocampus is strongly involved in mediating contextually rich, detailed memories at remote and recent time points.
Reengagement of the Hippocampus: Systems Reconsolidation
Although animal models of retrograde amnesia have provided compelling evidence for the transient role of the hippocampus in retrieving certain kinds of memories, they do not www.annualreviews.org • A Bridge Over Troubled Waternecessarily rule out the participation of the hippocampus in remote memory in intact animals. A few studies have suggested that although the hippocampus becomes dispensable for retrieving remote contextual fear memory, the structure still plays an important role in processing the memory once it has been retrieved (Debiec et al. 2002 , Frankland et al. 2006 , Land et al. 2000 . In a study by Debiec et al. (2002) , hippocampal lesions were ineffective when performed 45 days after training, indicating that at that time point, systems consolidation was complete. However, if the remote memory was reactivated immediately before applying the lesion, the animals were amnesic when tested later. Lesions of the hippocampus were only effective if performed up to two days after reactivation. Thus, an apparent hippocampus-independent memory became again transiently hippocampus-dependent, suggesting the existence of a systems reconsolidation process. Furthermore, local infusion of the protein-synthesis inhibitor anisomycin into the hippocampus at either recent or remote time points after training also resulted in memory impairment on a later test. Similar to the lesioning effect, impairment following anisomycin infusions was contingent on prior memory reactivation. Indirect evidence for the reengagement of the hippocampus and its role in mediating detailed memory comes from a study measuring the specificity of contextual fear memories in mice over time (Wiltgen & Silva 2007) . After establishing that contextual fear memory becomes more generalized over a time course that corresponds to systems consolidation (∼35 days), it was found that the reactivation of the memory on day 35 restored context discrimination when tested a day later as the animals now did not generalize their fear to a novel context.
Together, these findings suggest that systems consolidation, like cellular consolidation, may not be a unidirectional process of memory fixation. Rather, reactivation of a remote memory can re-engage the hippocampus and possibly restore a generalized memory back to a more detailed form.
Memory Schemas and Systems Consolidation
Interestingly, a recent study has suggested that systems consolidation can occur as quickly as within one day of learning new information, if the animal had previously acquired a "schema" allowing for incorporation of new information (Tse et al. 2007) . In this study, paired-associate learning was used, and rats were trained to use different flavors of food as cues to retrieve an associative spatial memory. After weeks of training several paired-associates with different spatial properties, new associates could be learned in a single trial. Furthermore, although the memory was sensitive to lesions of the hippocampus three hours after training of such new associates, lesions two days after training had no effect on later memory expression. This suggests that the memory remains hippocampus-dependent only within these two days after training, a steeper temporal gradient of systems consolidation than has been found before in other tasks. The authors suggest that extended training on this task allowed the creation of a neocortical "schema," into which new memories could be rapidly integrated, thereby becoming quickly independent of the hippocampus. However, alternatively, this schema may also be stored in the hippocampus or the hippocampus-cortical network. Either way, these findings suggest that in order to add new learning onto an existing schema, the hippocampus only has to be involved for a short period of time to allow storage of new knowledge in cortical areas, such that it is no longer necessary for expressing the memory afterward. Interestingly, the two-day sensitivity of the new knowledge being added to the existing cortical schema is a time course similar to the one found for systems reconsolidation of contextual fear memories (Debiec et al. 2002) . Systems reconsolidation of the cortically based schema memory might have been induced during the final training day. The new information could then have been incorporated into the cortical schema as it quickly underwent systems reconsolidation.
As we discuss below, memory-updating processes in humans occur very rapidly, on the order of minutes and hours (cf. the sections on misinformation effect and hindsight bias). Unlike animals, the material used in human studies usually is meaningful, such as words, pictures, and stories, and represents instances of semantic knowledge (and schemas; Bartlett 1932) . Thus, in humans, the reconsolidation-induced memory modification may occur almost immediately (see also Fagen & Rovee-Collier 1983) .
THEORIES OF SYSTEMS CONSOLIDATION
McClelland and associates (1995) proposed a connectionist model, building on ideas initially formulated by Marr (1971) . They assume that the hippocampal system rapidly stores new episodes and "replays" them to the slowerlearning neocortical system, interleaving the new episodes with previous knowledge, thus allowing for generalization as cortical memories form. This type of hippocampus-driven memory reinstatement, which in turn reinstates the neocortical memory system, can take place either in task-relevant situations or off-line, i.e., through rehearsal or reactivation during sleep. The model further proposes that reinstatement of a pattern in the hippocampal system can strengthen the hippocampal representation itself, as well as the representation in the neocortex. Thus, reactivation can reinstate memories in both hippocampal and cortical memory systems, i.e., according to the reconsolidation hypothesis, memory reactivation can induce lability in both systems. Such self-reinforcement could impede the decay of the hippocampal trace, thus delaying its systems consolidation. However, the authors note that this would possibly not happen during off-line reinstatement, i.e., during some stages of sleep when hippocampal synaptic plasticity has been found to be suppressed (Leonard et al. 1987 ). The connectionist model assumes that all hippocampusdependent memories undergo a similar timedependent consolidation process and thus does not make any distinction between more detailed memories and more schematic ones. Therefore, findings from neuroimaging studies showing that retrieval of even very old, detailed episodic and spatial memories engages the hippocampus are not consistent with the model. The model can accommodate memory reconsolidation, as it assumes that memory reactivation can reinstate both hippocampal and cortical representations, thus making them again transiently labile. However, accounting for hippocampal reconsolidation of a memory following systems consolidation, which rendered memory expression hippocampus-independent, is more difficult.
The standard consolidation theory posits that the hippocampus plays a time-limited role in memory for all declarative memory (semantic, episodic, and spatial) (Squire & Alvarez 1995 , Squire et al. 1984 . The theory assumes that memory is stored in the same neocortical areas specialized in processing the relevant information and that the hippocampus is initially required for memory acquisition and later retrieval. The role of the hippocampus is to provide "indices" that link neocortical representations, which are too dispersed and weakly linked to support memory retrieval on their own. Through a gradual process of reorganization, connections between cortical regions are progressively strengthened until they become strong enough to support the memory independently of the hippocampus, such that it is no longer required or involved in later recall. Similar to the connectionist model, the standard consolidation theory is ill equipped to account for recent neuroimaging findings of hippocampal engagement in retrieval of remote, detailed, contextually rich episodic and spatial memories, and animal studies showing that the hippocampus is critical for expressing context-dependent and detailed spatial memories. Furthermore, the theory is fundamentally challenged by findings of reconsolidation as it assumes that systems consolidation is a unidirectional process.
Although partly based on the standard consolidation model, the multiple trace theory was developed as a response to some of the main tenets of that theory (Moscovitch & Nadel 1998 , Nadel & Moscovitch 1997 standard consolidation model, multiple trace theory posits that information is sparsely encoded in a hippocampal-neocortical memory trace. The hippocampus contains representations that bind together memory content in neocortical areas. In addition, the most recent version of this account puts more emphasis on the idea that the re-encoding of hippocampal memories allows the extraction of semantic memories, which are then stored independently of episodic memory and the hippocampus (Nadel et al. 2007b ). This process of building up extrahippocampal semantic memory is similar to systems consolidation. The model makes the same distinctions for spatial memory, assuming that coarse topographical representations can exist independently of the hippocampus, but rich, detailed spatial memories will always require this brain structure (Rosenbaum et al. 2001) . Findings from human neuroimaging studies and animal models showing the continuing involvement of the hippocampus in expressing old detailed memories (detailed, contextually rich episodic and spatial memories in humans and context-dependent memories in animals) fit well with the multiple trace model's position that the hippocampus always mediates rich episodic and spatial memories, whereas neocortical structures can support more coarse or schematic representations independently of the hippocampus. Reconsolidation has also found a place in more recent versions of multiple trace theory, as it is now assumed that reactivation of episodic memories can lead to their reinstatement in the hippocampus (Nadel et al. 2007b ). However, similar to the connectionist model, it is unclear whether the model allows for reconsolidation of more schematic memories that are not mediated by the hippocampus.
None of the theories mentioned above can readily account for recent findings of rapid system consolidation after animals have acquired an associative framework or schema. All three models assume that systems consolidation of memory is a strictly time-dependent process and do not directly propose mechanisms that could hasten that process.
MEMORY MALLEABILITY EFFECTS AND RECONSOLIDATION
Many experimental demonstrations of the reconsolidation phenomenon imply that retrieval is far more than a passive read-out of memory: Retrieval transfers memory into a state of transient plasticity. In this state, memory can be modified in various ways; it can be impaired (Amorapanth et al. 2000) , enhanced (Lee 2008) , or distorted (Hupbach et al. 2007 , Walker et al. 2003 . These findings suggest a minimum of two possible functional roles for postretrieval plasticity. First, memory reactivation allows for modulation of memory strength. Second, it permits memory updating. In this sense, reconsolidation ultimately serves an adaptive purpose, as it allows existing memory to be quickly recalibrated by adding of new knowledge and weakening and strengthening of certain memory contents (for similar positions on retrieval, see, e.g., Bjork 1975 , Boller & Rovee-Collier 1994 , Lee 2009 , McDaniel & Masson 1985 , Sara 2000 .
The reconsolidation phenomenon therefore directly relates to a rich tradition of research in cognitive psychology demonstrating the malleability of human memory. Under this umbrella term, we here subsume phenomena showing that memory can change with use, either in strength or in contents. Both types, we try to argue, can be explained within a unifying framework that is based on the neurobiologically sound concept of postretrieval plasticity and reconsolidation, the subsequent stabilization process.
In our overview of the literature on cognitive malleability, we first turn to changes in memory contents, phenomena that are most convincingly demonstrated by distortions of memory, such as the misinformation effect, hindsight bias, and memory interference. Psychological research on this common observation owes much to the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932) . His basic method was to submit his participants to repeated free reproductions of the studied material (the most famous being an American folk talk about "The War of the Ghosts"), with recall intervals ranging from immediately to several years. Bartlett found that what participants remembered of this unusual story revealed several forms of systematic mnemonic effects that can affect memory accuracy. Bartlett's influential contribution to cognitive concepts of memory was the basic insight that memory in essence is a schema-mediated reconstruction: What can be recalled will therefore systematically deviate from the original in accordance to the schemata recruited during encoding and reconstruction. Although there was some dissent regarding whether Bartlett's findings replicate, recent studies that attentively reproduced his original method were able to find the original effects (e.g., Ahlberg & Sharps 2002 , Wheeler & Roediger 1992 ).
An alternative explanation for schematization can be derived from a study originally designed to examine the effects of verbal labels given at encoding on later recognition. Daniel (1972) presented participants with a series of images that showed systematic variations of a base image (e.g., duck, camel). These studied instances all deviated to the same degree from their respective base object, and all were presented with the word correctly identifying it. The recognition test followed immediately, or up to two days later. In this test, the studied instance and other nonstudied instances that deviated more or less than the studied item from the base object were presented in a randomized order. Participants had better recognition memory for the studied instance shortly after the test than after a delay. Importantly, the longer the retention interval, the more often participants incorrectly identified as the studied item nonstudied instances that deviated less from the base form. Although these results may be taken as suggesting that over time memory gets restructured toward a semantic category, or schema, an equally valid alternative explanation may be that over time the perceptual component of the original memory fades away and simply is forgotten while the conceptual component, in this case, the verbal label, remains. As a consequence, recognition of forms that closely resemble the studied concept (e.g., the "typical" duck) will be more and more likely falsely recognized as the studied instance.
This memory "distortion" represents a memory transformation that, by virtue of decay of perceptual details (i.e., forgetting), reveals the embedded conceptual core. Unlike current models of memory organization reviewed in the previous section (e.g., MTT), which understand such transformations rather as the active extraction of knowledge (e.g., semanticization) than forgetting, Daniel's (1972) findings suggest that semanticization may result from a decay of perceptual (i.e., visual, olfactory, tactile, spatial, etc.) detail, thereby revealing the semantic contents underlying the memory of an experience. During later recall, then, this conceptual skeleton is used to rebuild a detailed event memory, using factual knowledge to fill in the gaps and generate vividness, which is thus largely imagined rather than experienced (cf. Schacter & Addis 2007) . Such a process may explain why flashbulb memories, as we show below, are highly detailed but overall mostly inaccurate.
In a similar way, Bartlett's research suggests that encoding and retrieval processes cannot be categorically separated. In fact, encoding almost inevitably causes retrieval of related knowledge and experiences, just as retrieval may lead to the incorporation of new elements into existing memories (see also Bjork 1975) . In this sense, retrieval has the potential to change what is being retrieved. That both memory processes are related was an idea expressed at the beginning of the twentieth century by Richard Semon (1904 Semon ( , 1909 . He suggested that the engram is the result of both encoding (engraphy) and retrieval (ecphory) processes. As a consequence, the engram does not correspond only to the actual experience, but also to related engrams already present in the brain (see Schacter 2001 for a detailed discussion of Semon's work).
Hence, failures of memory, as Ribot (1881) remarked in his monograph, provide us with opportunities to discover fundamental www.annualreviews.org • A Bridge Over Troubled Watermechanisms underpinning normal memory. However, with the notable exception of research on interference, memory distortions were rarely studied in the years that followed these early demonstrations and conceptualizations, and were regarded more as an obstacle in understanding the laws governing learning and retention. When the cognitive revolution took up speed, marked by Neisser's (1967) book establishing the field, interest in these "sins" of memory revitalized (Schacter 1999) . Like Bartlett before him, Neisser argued that memories of past events are essentially complex reconstructions that regenerate an experience by piecing together whatever fragments remain from the original experience, drawing from semantic knowledge and other related episodic fragments and memories to fill in missing elements. The very act of reconstruction gives room for distortions of many kinds.
In the following section we discuss some of these distortions, which illustrate the malleability of memory, and which could potentially be explained within a framework built on the observation that memory reactivation induces plasticity and memory reconsolidation. So far, explanations of these malleability phenomena have not considered explicitly reactivation as a critical precondition for memory change to occur. A second look at the paradigms used to study the effects, however, reveals that some form of reactivation is always part of the procedure: For example, flashbulb memories are studied in repeated memory tests spaced out over weeks and months, and the consistency of these memories declines with repeated retrieval; in the misinformation paradigm, the misleading questions necessarily have to explicitly refer to the previously witnessed event; in hindsight bias studies, an explicit reference to the initial study session is made, and, in some paradigms, the original material is repeated; memory interference has been traditionally studied in a paired-associates paradigm, in which interference effects are obtained by repairing parts of the original stimulus with new items, thereby reactivating the original memory; and reminiscence, hypermnesia, and flashbulb memories illustrate the effects of repeated retrieval on retention.
From this list of memory malleability phenomena we excluded research on false memories (Deese 1959 , Roediger & McDermott 1995 , Underwood 1965 , as these appear related more to effects that occur during encoding, i.e., initial memory acquisition. As several authors have suggested, false memories may be the result of relatedness effects, in that associated existing knowledge and memories become automatically associated with the items to be studied (Roediger & McDermott 2000) . As a consequence, during later memory recall, these unstudied but related items will also be recalled. Consider, for example, Deese's (1959) demonstration that participants who studied words that were semantically strongly associated to a word that itself was not on the list (e.g., bed, rest, awake) were likely to falsely produce the nonstudied word (e.g., sleep) when asked to free recall the studied items. Underwood (1965) reported a similar effect and suggested that implicit associated responses caused false recognition of unstudied but related words. These accounts imply at the very least that studying the stimulus material reactivated existing memories; whether or not this reactivation constitutes retrieval can be debated. However, since these effects occur during encoding, the distortion observed during later recall appears to be mediated by memory consolidation during initial encoding rather than by reconsolidation during retrieval. Brown & Kulik (1977) introduced the term flashbulb memory to describe exceptionally accurate memories for public events of high salience (e.g., the Kennedy assassination, Challenger explosion, death of Michael Jackson). They believed that these memories are encoded by a unique memory process (the "now print" mechanism) that, like a camera, quickly stores a large quantity of information that, unlike a camera, not only comprises the critical event but also antecedent and subsequent events and brain states, such as knowledge about where the event was experienced, who was present, with whom the event was discussed subsequently, and how the weather was. Flashbulb memories thus appear different from other event-related memories in that they exhibit higher richness in detail and higher levels of accuracy and consistency over longer retention intervals. Since such memories also have a higher likelihood of being retold numerous times, they may pose a problem for our suggestion that retrieval induces states of plasticity that allow for memory distortions.
Flashbulb Memories
The vividness of recalled flashbulb memories appears to be more a function of accompanying affective states (cf. Schooler et al. 1997) , which may reflect memory for the emotions experienced during witnessing the event, or which may result as a response during recall of the experience. Evidence for the claim that flashbulb memories are of higher accuracy than normal memories has been mixed and the associated debate controversial (e.g., Bohannon 1988, Conway et al. 1994 , McCloskey et al. 1988 , Neisser & Harsh 1992 , Pillemer 1984 . Recent research, however, demonstrated that flashbulb memories are no more accurate than ordinary memories, exhibiting forgetting over time and schema-mediated distortions. For example, Neisser & Harsh (1992) report that memory for the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger systematically declined in terms of accuracy, despite being rich in detail and accompanied by high subjective confidence in the accuracy of the recalled events. However, a study by Conway et al. (1994) , comparing the memories that U.S. and U.K. citizens retained of the resignation of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 showed markedly higher recall rates for the U.K. citizens at a remote memory test (11 months after the event), as well as a much greater consistency between the remote and initial test, which was administered two weeks after the event. Two factors mediating the consistency and thus fixedness of flashbulb memories have been isolated. First, Conway et al.'s (1994) findings indicate that arousal may play a significant role in whether flashbulb memories remain stable or are subject to alteration and forgetting. Correlations between self-reported emotional response elicited by witnessing the event and recall consistency over repeated tests suggest that higher arousal is associated with reduced malleability of flashbulb memories (e.g., Bohannon 1988). The second factor that can influence accuracy appears to be how close in time the first memory test occurs to witnessing the critical event. Because memories of events of high salience have a higher tendency to be told and retold, especially shortly after they are experienced, memory distortions may be incorporated early after the event. Thus, if the first memory test, against which consistency of later tests will be compared, is administered immediately after the event, consistency will be lower than when administering the initial assessment after a longer delay (e.g., Christianson & Engelberg 1999 , Winningham et al. 2000 . Given the evidence, it appears that flashbulb memories are not different from memories for ordinary events, in that they are prone to decay and distortions (e.g., McCloskey 1992 , Rubin & Kozin 1984 and that their stability depends on the strength of encoding. Therefore, our conceptual suggestions regarding the genesis of long-lasting memory and memory distortions also apply to flashbulb memories.
Misleading Postevent Information
In what is probably the most widely known study of misleading questions on event memory, Loftus et al. (1978) showed participants slides of an accident involving a red Datsun. Immediately, as well as one day, two days, or one week afterward, participants were asked to answer questions about the depicted events. One was the critical misleading question, asking whether there was a "stop" sign at the in intersection where the Datsun made the fatal turn that led to the accident, while in fact there was a "yield" sign. Twenty minutes after these questions, a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test was administered, in which participants had to decide which of two slides they had www.annualreviews.org • A Bridge Over Troubled Wateroriginally seen. False recognition rates were highest when the misleading question was presented two weeks after witnessing the event. In an attempt to address whether motivational factors rather than distortions of memory account for the false recognition rates, in another experiment participants were debriefed right after the recognition test and then had the opportunity to state what sign they actually had seen and what sign had been mentioned in the leading question. This manipulation did not recover the original memory. Loftus and colleagues interpreted this finding as supporting their claim that misleading questions can lead to permanent memory distortions (for an alternative account based on biased guessing instead on biased memory, see McCloskey & Zaragoza 1985) . Further studies have shown that neither monetary incentives for correct recognitions nor suggestions that correct recalls are associated with higher intelligence were effective in reducing the memory distortions induced by misleading postevent information (Loftus 1979b) . However, Loftus (1979b) reported that "blatantly" wrong postevent information will not lead to false recognition. As we discuss below, this is another similarity between misinformation effect and hindsight bias.
Explanations of the distortion ranged from the "update and erase" model (Loftus & Loftus 1980) , in which it is assumed that the original knowledge is irrecoverably replaced by the misleading information, to the idea that original and new knowledge are fused into "representational blends" (e.g., Schooler & Tanaka 1991 ; see also Metcalfe & Bjork 1991) , to the suggestions that old and new knowledge coexist (e.g., Loftus & Loftus 1980) . Recent neuroimaging work suggests that instead of retrieval, the effect depends on events during encoding (Okado & Stark 2005) . However, it has not yet been determined how to best account for the phenomenon, although some explanations seem more likely than others. Recent neuroimaging work suggests the reconsolidation phenomenon could be of potential use to shed light on the memory processes involved, although the question of whether reactivation is a necessary condition for the effect to occur might be impossible to answer because the misinformation is introduced by explicit reference to the original event. One could therefore argue that the experimental design invoked to demonstrate the misinformation effect essentially is an instance of a reconsolidation protocol. The fact that repeating the misinformation (Zaragoza & Mitchell 1996) or repeated retrieval of the misinformation (e.g., Roediger et al. 1996) enhances the misinformation effect provides support for our suggestion that at the root of this phenomenon lie retrieval-induced plasticity processes and reconsolidation. In terms of the reconsolidation notion, this memory distortion could be explained as a process that allows new information to be included in the existing memory representation, as it became plastic after reactivation (cf. Hupbach et al. 2007 ). Progress in research on the boundary conditions and parameters of the reconsolidation process might be of potential practical use here, as this might allow questioning eyewitnesses in a way that will not lead to memory distortion (by, for example, changing the context of the first questioning; cf. Hupbach et al. 2008) . One could imagine that either the old memory is prevented from undergoing reconsolidation or that initiated reconsolidation processes following reactivation are blocked from completion such that no long-term memory distortions will be caused.
Hindsight Bias
Hindsight bias has been demonstrated for a variety of materials and experimental conditions, such as short stories, medical diagnoses, political prognoses, and knowledge questions (for reviews, see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham 1991 , Hawkins & Hastie 1990 . Although first studied using stories and episodes (e.g., Fischhoff 1975 Fischhoff , 1977 Wood 1978) , almanac-like questions are often used because of a nearly three-times larger effect size (Christensen-Szalanski & Wilham 1991) . A typical experiment using this material consists of three phases. First, participants are asked to respond to difficult questions to which they usually do not know the answer and have to use their existing knowledge on the subject matter to provide an estimate (e.g., "How high is the Eiffel tower?"). Second, some time afterward, they are provided with additional information pertaining to the previously answered questions (e.g., they are given the actual solutions, the estimates of others, or random numbers). Finally, they are asked to recall their original answer to the question. Typically, the remembered answer is biased, such that in hindsight, it is closer to the additional information presented in the second phase than it initially had been.
It appears that the "better" the original memory (in terms of strength, precision, and detail), the smaller the probability of hindsight bias. Like the misinformation effect, hindsight bias thus dwells on the fuzziness of the knowledge that is assessed. If participants are likely to know the correct solutions to the questions presented, the obtained bias can be expected to be small (Christensen-Szalanski & Wilham 1991) . Hindsight bias positively correlates with depth of anchor encoding (Wood 1978) and negatively correlates with depth of estimate encoding (e.g., Hell et al. 1988 ). Hindsight bias is larger the shorter the interval between anchor presentation and recollection (e.g., Erdfelder & Buchner 1998 , Hell et al. 1988 and larger the longer the interval between estimation and anchor presentation (Fischhoff & Beyth 1975) . Similarly, the longer the time between estimation and anchor presentation, the lower the probability to correctly recall the original answer (e.g., Fischhoff 1975 , Hell et al. 1988 , Pennington 1981 . These time-dependent effects can be understood as a function of forgetting of the estimate over time, which decreases its probability of being retrieved (Hell et al. 1988) .
It has been frequently demonstrated that participants will consider even blatantly arbitrary values: Hindsight bias was not smaller when the supplemental information was determined by a coin toss (Connolly & Bukzar 1990) . Hindsight bias also cannot be reduced by informing participants about the nature of the bias (e.g., Fischhoff 1977 , Pohl & Hell 1996 , instructing them to "work hard" (e.g., Fischhoff 1975), or offering (financial) incentives to not be biased (e.g., Hell et al. 1988 , Wood 1978 . However, elimination of hindsight bias can be achieved when the supplemental information was subsequently discredited as being wrong (Hasher et al. 1981 ) and when participants were asked to generate alternatives or think about the opposite outcome (cf. Davies 1992 , Slovic & Fischhoff 1977 . showed that the less plausible the anchor, the smaller the bias it caused, and that the plausibility ascribed to an anchor was directly correlated to the extent the anchor deviated from the individual's knowledge. Fischhoff (1975) introduced the concept of creeping determinism to account for hindsight bias. According to this notion, the presented outcome information becomes immediately assimilated into the participant's domain knowledge, which thereby gets restructured in light of the new information in order to resolve ambiguities by "strengthening associative links with reasons supporting the answer" (Fischhoff 1977, p. 356) . He suggested that this process was automatically initiated, and its impact on the knowledge representations was therefore unavoidable. A recent model of hindsight bias incorporates and extends these ideas. The selective activation, reconstruction, and anchoring (SARA) model , which borrows some concepts from the search-of-associativememory framework (Shiffrin & Raaijmakers 1992) , assumes that long-term memory representations are associated with each other with links of varying strength that indicate their mutual retrieval probabilities. The closer certain memories are related, the greater the strength of their association and the higher the probability that activation of one will lead to an activation of the other. In SARA, it is assumed that presentation of supplemental information automatically initiates an encoding process that transfers this information to long-term memory, during which related memories are also retrieved. As a consequence of retrieval, the associations of the related memories are increased www.annualreviews.org • A Bridge Over Troubled Waterin strength, such that they are more likely to be recalled later. Subsequent information retrieval hence is biased toward the supplemental information and similar, related memories. These ideas are thus similar to suggestions that learning will always induce retrieval of related knowledge that has already been committed to memory (Bartlett 1932; Semon 1904 Semon , 1909 and that retrieval will lead to changes in existing memory (e.g., Bjork 1975) .
The basic idea of SARA, that retrieval changes the strength of associations in longterm memory, corresponds directly to the reconsolidation hypothesis, in that reactivating long-term memory induces states of plasticity, which allow memory to be strengthened, weakened, and which permit new information to be integrated into existing memories. These memory-modification processes ultimately make memory distortions possible, although for the most part, they allow memory to be adaptive, as they permit updating existing knowledge in light of new information. Thus, SARA and the creeping determinism notion invoke concepts that are highly similar to the schema-driven quick systems consolidation found in animals (discussed in the previous section; Tse et al. 2007 ).
Forgetting, Interference, Reminiscence, and Hypermnesia
After more than a century of research, little agreement exists about the mechanism of forgetting, and two central controversies remain unresolved to this day. First, the lack of performance after successful training could reflect storage (i.e., consolidation) impairments, such that memory is unavailable and can therefore not be expressed, or it could be due to retrieval failure, as available memory permanently or transiently cannot be accessed (Nader & Wang 2006) . The second controversy concerns the possible reasons for actual loss of memory, thus taking the position that failures to express memory reflect its unavailability rather than inaccessibility. Here two positions are debated, one that ascribes forgetting to the decay of memory traces, the other arguing that interference, not decay, causes memory decline.
The decay hypothesis was entertained for some time at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Jost's law of forgetting represents an early formulation of the idea that the main factor determining forgetting rate is the passage of time and not the strength of a memory. Specifically, his law states that given two associations of equal strength but different age, the older will decay slower than the younger one as time progresses ( Jost 1897 ). Thorndike's (1914) laws of use and disuse (subsumed under his "Law of Exercise") extend the idea by suggesting that trace decay over time can be prevented if memory is used or attended, which leads to a strengthening of memory. Indeed, repeated retrieval can improve memory retention, and Ballard (1913) was the first to study these effects systematically. He coined the term "reminiscence," referring to a peculiar beneficial effect repeated testing, i.e., memory retrieval, exerted on memory performance. Asking school children to memorize poems, and then subsequently testing them several times, he observed that lines of the studied poems that were not recalled on earlier tests could be recalled on later tests despite the absence of interpolated learning; in some cases, the total gain compensated forgetting, resulting in overall improved memory performance. Although reminiscence has been observed in most studies of repeated free recall tests, the effect rarely leads to the overall performance increase originally reported by Ballard (e.g., Tulving 1967) . A related phenomenon of retrieval on memory performance is hypermnesia. Introduced by Erdelyi & Becker (1974) , it refers to an overall increase in the number of remembered items as a function of repeated memory tests, which thus differs from reminiscence, the recall of items on later tests that were not recalled on earlier ones. Both effects can be reliably obtained in repeated-testing paradigms (Wheeler & Roediger 1992) . These findings thus support, albeit indirectly, the idea that one possible reason for forgetting is memory decay.
Jost's law thus hints at the idea of memory consolidation, proposed by Müller & Pilzecker (1900) shortly thereafter, suggesting that, if not disrupted, a perseveration-consolidation process stabilizes memory over time-hence younger memories should be less stable than older memories and thus more susceptible to forgetting than older ones. It is important to note that Müller and Pilzecker considered mental processes that are unrelated to the memory being consolidated, as well as interfering intrusions of similar material as possible forces disturbing ongoing consolidation processes, but did not base their theory on a trace decay notion.
One of the earliest empirical tests of the consolidation account was Jenkins & Dallenbach's (1924) now classical study, which employed sleep as a factor in the experimental design and can therefore be considered a precursor to a research paradigm that in recent years produced important findings on memory organization (e.g., Rasch et al. 2007; Wagner et al. 2003 Wagner et al. , 2004 . Jenkins & Dallenbach (1924) asked two subjects to study a list of nonsense syllables, with the difference that one subject learned the list prior to retiring for the night, while the other subject studied the syllables in the morning after waking up. The number of correctly recalled syllables was higher when recalled after sleep than wakefulness. Jenkins & Dallenbach (1924) concluded from their results that forgetting is due to "interference, inhibition, or obliteration of the old by the new" (p. 612), and not to decay, thereby supporting the notion that disrupting consolidation processes after learning will also disrupt memory. Although their results do not rule out that once consolidation is complete, passive trace decay may be a cause of forgetting, the interference account became the defacto explanation of forgetting in the decades that followed, and McGeoch's (1932) critique on passage-of-time-based decay notions as well as his outspoken support for interference processes as causal agents for forgetting contributed to this shift in focus.
A substantial body of data on memory interference phenomena has been produced using the well-known paired-associates technique. Typically, participants first study a list of word pairs (A-B), and later are presented with another list, in which words from the first list are paired with new ones (A-C). Finally, they are provided with A as a cue to retrieve C. Interference manifests as a performance impairment relative to a control group that did not study A-B initially. Some have argued that this paradigm models most everyday forgetting (Underwood 1957) , but observations such as those provided by Jenkins & Dallenbach (1924) cast doubt on this claim, and later studies led ultimately to a rejection of this account (cf. Underwood & Ekstrand 1966) . Alternatives have recently been suggested that attribute loss of memory more to interfering basic mental activity, which reduces available resources of brain areas involved in consolidation of new memories, such as the hippocampus (Wixted 2004 ). It appears that the field now approaches again notions articulated by Müller and Pilzecker at the beginning of the past century, which have been put onto a sound neurobiological basis in the past decades.
In the same spirit, we propose that memory reconsolidation processes following retrieval mediate some of these forgetting effects. The beneficial effects of repeated testing could be a function of reconsolidation processes strengthening reactivated memory (e.g., Gordon 1981) . Interference effects, on the other hand, could be a function of memory modifications initiated by retrieval of existing memory in the presence of new information. The fact that interference effects are small when memory for A-B is tested shortly after learning of the A-C list, but larger when tested at time points more remote, directly supports the suggestion that reconsolidation processes underpin these distortions [for a similar account of interference in rats, see Gordon (1977a) ]-a defining characteristic of memory reconsolidation is intact postreactivation of short-term memory, but impaired postreactivation of long-term memory (Nader & Hardt 2009 ). This pattern has also been observed in a set of recent studies on reconsolidation of human episodic memory www.annualreviews.org • A Bridge Over Troubled Water (Hupbach et al. 2007 (Hupbach et al. , 2008 . Using a memoryinterference paradigm, these authors showed that intrusions into memory for a list of objects were observed when participants were tested two days after learning a second list, but not when tested immediately after learning.
TOWARD A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
Our short review of the literature on memory distortions and forgetting documents a rich tradition of research and theory formation about how memory might be organized. For the most part of its history, this research tradition took little notice of the developments in neuroscience that addressed, largely in the animal model, the same basic question, namely how brains create and maintain memories (cf. Wixted 2004) . On the other hand, neuroscience research programs have often failed to recognize that their concepts born out of animal models need also account for the dynamic nature of consolidated memories. Although recent advances in cognitive neuroscience try to overcome the divide of these fields, they do so mostly by applying neuroscientific methods on human populations (e.g., Schacter et al. 1998 ). Approaches to unite the fields by applying theoretical concepts developed in one to study a phenomenon in the other so far have been rare [for a review of reactivation-based memory studies in human infants, see Rovee-Collier (1997) ], but have become more prevalent in recent years (e.g., Easton et al. 2009 , Hardt et al. 2009a , Hupbach et al. 2008 , Kesner et al. 2008 , Sauvage et al. 2008 , Tse et al. 2007 , Winocur et al. 2007 ).
We mentioned above two possible functions for postreactivation memory plasticity and reconsolidation. First, reconsolidation might lead to a change in the strength of the reactivated memory: Similar to consolidation processes that unfold after learning and transform a transient memory trace into a long-lasting one, reconsolidation processes following retrieval of long-term memory allow reactivated memory to be strengthened or weakened. Second, reconsolidation may allow for modifying the contents of reactivated long-term memory by allowing new stimuli that are present at the time of retrieval to be associated with the transiently malleable memory. We assume that there may be cases when consolidation mechanisms update memory (Tronel et al. 2005 ) and others when reconsolidation processes are employed. For example, reconsolidation induced by exposure to the original learning environment is both necessary and sufficient to induce intrusions into memory for lists of objects without simultaneously reducing the number of correctly recalled items (Hupbach et al. 2008) . It is thus an empirical question under which conditions consolidation or reconsolidation mechanisms contribute to these "sins" of memory.
A closer look at the memory malleability effects we discuss here reveals two principal types of phenomena: those characterized by retrieval-induced distortions, elicited by providing external retrieval cues, and those involving retrieval-induced memory strengthening in the absence of external cues. First, misinformation effect, hindsight bias, and interference all involve an explicit partial representation of previously learned stimuli: In the misinformation effect, participants are presented with a question that refers to an aspect of the original experience and simultaneously introduces novel information. In hindsight bias studies, participants are reminded of a previous experience and then are explicitly provided with some important information pertaining to it. In the basic interference paradigm, participants first study a list of word pairs, and later this memory is reactivated by reexposing the participants to one of the words now paired with a new one. What characterizes the results obtained from these experimental protocols is that the original memory gets distorted; alternatively, one could also interpret the distortion as the effects of a memory-updating process that, under normal conditions, produces adaptive behavior. As has been speculated for the possible functional reasons for hindsight bias: Why should participants not modify their knowledge when they are presented with information that they believe to be the solution to a question of which they did not know the exact answer? A memory system that can change quickly when relevant information becomes available will serve its owner well. Since in all reviewed cases, memory reactivation was part of the procedure to induce the observed memory change, we suggest that these experimental paradigms are methodologically equivalent to animal and human studies on memory reconsolidation.
The second type of retrieval-induced memory phenomena is illustrated by effects such as hypermnesia and reminiscence, beneficial results of repeated memory testing (and thus retrieval), leading in both cases to memory improvement. These effects are obtained in freerecall situations, in which external cues aiding retrieval are not provided, which might be a reason why reminiscence and hypermnesia effects typically co-occur. Again, we propose that retrieval induces reconsolidation of the reactivated memory. Since no new information is provided in these experimental procedures, memory updating will not be observed. Rather, the reactivated components will be strengthened. There is good reason to assume that reactivation of one element of a more complex memory leads to reactivation of the associated components (Nyberg et al. 2000 ; cf. spreading activation concept, Collins & Loftus 1975) . Indeed, reactivation has been shown to enhance retention of a consolidated memory (Gordon & Mowrer 1980) , and a recent study demonstrated that repeated retrieval of episodic memories led to an increase in the number of details recalled (Nadel et al. 2007a ). Additionally, owing to forgetting and different initial strengths, not all components of a complex memory have equal recall probabilities. Therefore, retrievalinduced memory strengthening might affect subsequent recall probability differentially, leading to hypermnesia for some elements and reminiscence for others, and a similar process might be responsible for the good retention but poor accuracy of flashbulb memories, i.e., memories for highly salient events (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall) that are typically retold many times, especially shortly after they were experienced. As discussed above, repeated retrieval in the form of retelling the event has been isolated as one of the factors that contributes to the persistence of flashbulb memories. Thus, flashbulb memories appear similar to hypermnesia and reminiscence, as all these phenomena seem to be associated with repeated retrieval attempts, which, we propose, trigger memory reconsolidation processes that strengthen and stabilize the reactivated memory.
One may ask what benefits arise for cognitive psychology from our analysis suggesting that a neuroscientifically documented memory reconsolidation process lies at the root of several (cognitive) memory malleability phenomena. First, grounding a set of cognitive phenomena in biologically plausible memory processes limits the space of probable theoretical explanations for the effects and may thus reduce the number of proposed theoretical models. The same holds for the neuroscientific theories promoted to explain these phenomena: Their usefulness is also determined by how well they fare when applied to basic phenomena studied in cognitive psychology. Second, it may stimulate the development of animal models to study these phenomena in more rigorous ways, allowing interventions that directly affect the proposed mechanisms and that reveal, on a systems level, the critical brain areas mediating the memory effect. Some of these interventions may then find their way into clinical research (e.g., Brunet et al. 2008) . Third, boundary conditions that have been documented for reconsolidation may explain why under certain conditions some memory distortions are not observed. For example, in rats, some strong memories do not undergo reconsolidation (e.g., Wang et al. 2009 ), as do certain memory types [e.g., memory for the spatial context in which something happened (Biedenkapp & Rudy 2004) ]. Similarly, in humans, stronger memories are less susceptible to some memory distortions (e.g., hindsight bias is reduced for "better" memories"; repeated exposure to misleading information leads to stronger misinformation effects than do single exposures).
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These boundary conditions may not only help in better understanding memory distortions, they may also be useful when the goal is to prevent rather than to demonstrate them.
What our basic framework lacks so far is an explanation for the type of memory transformations studied by Bartlett (1932) , in which repeated retrieval reveals schemaconsistent memory distortions as well as forgetting. Wheeler & Roediger (1992) pointed out that two of the main traditions of retrievalinduced memory alterations produce results that are hard to reconcile. Although Ballard (1913) and the research tradition that followed his footsteps demonstrated that repeated retrieval in form of free recall can lead to memory improvement (e.g., reminiscence and hypermnesia), Bartlett (1932) and the line of research he inspired consistently demonstrated that repeated retrieval in form of free recall reveals a transformation of the original memory in direction of a schema at the expense of detail and accuracy. Wheeler & Roediger (1992) isolate a factor mediating which memory effect will be observed given repeated testing. They conclude that hypermnesia and reminiscence will be observed in repeated testing when the time between the tests is brief, whereas forgetting effects as described by Bartlett will be revealed when longer times between the recurrent recalls are used.
Implied by our basic suggestion that postretrieval memory reconsolidation processes can strengthen memory is the assumption that forgetting exists as a basic memory process. As discussed in our brief review on memory interference phenomena, the nature of forgetting processes has not yet been determined, but the two main candidate mechanisms are decay of the biological substrate of memory and interference by other mental activity (cf. Wixted 2004) . A possible reconsolidation-based explanation of schematization on the one hand and hypermnesia and reminiscence on the other assumes that forgetting, in one form or another, occurs after memory acquisition. Not all aspects of an experience will be encoded at the same strength, and this can depend on numerous factors, such as level-of-processing (Craik & Lockhart 1972) , salience and relative distinctiveness (cf. von Restorff 1933) , the amount of attention paid to a stimulus [e.g., weapon focus phenomenon (see Loftus 1979a) ], or the expectations at encoding regarding how memory will be assessed later (Frost 1972) . We assume that forgetting will be more pronounced for the weaker components of a complex memory than for the stronger ones. If retrieval occurs shortly after acquisition, forgetting has not led to a pronounced loss of memory, such that even weaker components of the memory will still be available and benefit from reconsolidationmediated strengthening induced by reactivation. In these cases, hypermnesia and reminiscence will be observed. If, however, retrieval occurs later after initial learning, some of the weaker components may have faded away and only the remaining, stronger, aspects will benefit from reactivation. As Bartlett demonstrated, elements of an event that are unusual and alien, such as certain concepts in the famous "War of the Ghost" story, cannot be easily encoded, and might even during encoding suffer from a distortion by subsuming the unknown under a best-fitting existing semantic category (cf. Daniel 1972) or will not be encoded deeply, as proposed in the levels-of-processing framework. These weaker aspects of the memory for the story will thus be more quickly forgotten. If retrieval then occurs at intervals that are more widely spaced, only the still remaining components will be strengthened, which are most likely those that were consistent with existing knowledge from the beginning or were distorted such that they became consistent during encoding. This way, wider-spaced successive retrieval will reveal what is known as schematization, while shorter retrieval intervals will reveal hypermnesia and reminiscence.
The basic memory processes outlined here are part of most, if not all, networks in the brain. The system-level theories of memory organization reviewed above, such as the connectionist model, the standard model of consolidation, and the multiple trace theory do not yet capture the transformative nature of memory retrieval and need to incorporate cellular and systems reconsolidation processes into their frameworks. In a similar vein, neuroscience has largely ignored the influence of previous knowledge on new learning, which necessarily involves retrieval of relevant information during learning. Furthermore, these models have so far been silent on how to explain schematization of memory in humans and how to account for the sins of memory illustrated by the memory malleability phenomena we reviewed, and for which we tried to suggest a possible consolidation-reconsolidation, and thus neurobiologically based, conceptual foundation. The rapid progress we witnessed in recent years in the neuroscience and the cognitive neuroscience of memory holds great promise that such advances lie ahead. Ultimately, answers about the nature of memory must aim at integrating the two great research traditions, cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
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